

### Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model



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### Assumptions about production

Production technology and inputs evolution exactly the same as in Solow, but  $\delta = 0$  for simplicity.

► 
$$Y = F(K, AL);$$
 CRS;  $f(0) = 0;$   $f'(k) > 0;$   $f''(k) < 0;$   
 $lim_{k\to 0}f'(k) = \infty;$   $lim_{k\to \infty}f'(k) = 0.$ 

$$\overset{\dot{A}}{\overline{A}} = g_A = g; \qquad \overset{\dot{L}}{\overline{L}} = g = n$$

•  $\dot{K}(t) = Y(t) - \zeta(t)$  where  $\zeta$  is total consumption.

#### Representative firm assumption.



### Assumptions about households

Large but fixed number of identical households:

- each grows at rate n;
- household members are infinitely lived, forward-looking and have perfect foresight into the infinite future;
- they supply 1 unit of L at each point in time and earn wages;
- own K, that they rent to firms, earning K income;
- divide their income between C and I in such a way as to maximize utility over their (infinite) lifetime.
- representative household assumption.



## The Euler equation

Assumed households' behavior implies the Euler equation – the fundamental driver of this model:

$$g_C = \frac{\dot{C}(t)}{C(t)} = \frac{r(t) - \rho}{\theta}$$

- Higher interest rate induces to postpone consumption, so it contributes *positively* to its growth in time.
- Higher discount rate induces to anticipate consumption, so it contributes *negatively* to its growth in time.
- Let's now study formally how this equation follows from the assumptions of the model...



Household's utility function

$$U = \int_{t=0}^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} u(C(t)) \frac{L(t)}{H} dt$$

- gives PV of total utility enjoyed by household members over their lifetime.
- C = consumption per person.
- L/H = number of household members.
- $\triangleright \rho = \text{discount rate.}$
- instantaneous utility u():

$$u[C(t)] = \frac{C(t)^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta} \qquad \theta > 0; \qquad \rho - n - (1-\theta)g > 0$$



## Firms & factors' prices

Perfectly competitive firms in single-good economy, therefore

• interest rate: 
$$r(t) = f'[k(t)]$$

▶ wage per unit of eff. labor:  $w(t) = \frac{W(t)}{A} = [f(k) - kf'(k)]$ 



## No-Ponzi condition

► Household consumption is constrained by the PV of their wealth:

$$\lim_{s\to\infty} e^{-R(s)} K(s) \ge 0$$

Or, in 'intensive form' (scaled by AL):

$$\lim_{s \to \infty} e^{-R(s)} e^{(n+g)s} k(s) \ge 0$$

- No-Ponzi condition: household's asset holdings cannot be negative in the limit.
- Will be satisfied with equality.



## Households' dynamic optimization problem

Household maximizes PV of lifetime utility (intensive form):

$$\operatorname{Max} U = B \int_{t=0}^{\infty} e^{-\beta t} \frac{c(t)^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta} dt$$

with 
$$B = A(0)^{1-\theta} \frac{L(0)}{H}$$
 and  $\beta = \rho - n - (1-\theta)g$ 

subject to the state equation:

$$\dot{k}(t) = (r-n-g)k(t) + w(t) - c(t)$$

and the transversality (no-Ponzi w/ equality) condition:

$$\lim_{s\to\infty}e^{-R(s)}e^{(n+g)s}k(s)=0$$



### The Euler equation

$$\frac{\dot{c}(t)}{c(t)} = \frac{r(t) - \rho - \theta g}{\theta} = \frac{f'(k(t)) - \rho - \theta g}{\theta}$$

- This is the Euler equation we have seen before, but scaled by AL (intensive form). Same meaning and interpretation.
- ►  $r > \rho \rightarrow$  households postpone consumption  $\rightarrow c(t)$  increases in time.
- ►  $r < \rho \rightarrow$  households anticipate consumption  $\rightarrow c(t)$  decreases in time.



## The dynamics of the economy: c & k

Dynamics of c (Euler equation):

$$\frac{\dot{c}(t)}{c(t)} = \frac{f'(k(t)) - \rho - \theta g}{\theta}$$

Dynamics of k (like in Solow but w/o depreciation):

$$\dot{k} = f(k(t)) - c(t) - (n+g)k(t)$$

- intertemporal equilibrium:  $\dot{c} = 0$  and  $\dot{k} = 0$ ;
- two variables phase diagram









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# The dynamics of the economy: capital stock $\dot{k} = f(k(t)) - c(t) - (n+g)k(t)$







The dynamics of the economy: capital stock  $\dot{k} = f(k(t)) - c(t) - (n+g)k(t)$ 



- what's going on in this graph?
- $\dot{k} = 0 \quad \rightarrow \quad c^* = f(k) (n+g)k$
- ►  $c^*$  U-shaped: increasing in c as long as f'(k) > (n+g).
- ►  $c > c^* \rightarrow$ , investment lower than break-even  $\rightarrow k < 0$ .
- ►  $c < c^* \rightarrow$ , investment higher than break-even  $\rightarrow k > 0$ .



### The dynamics of the economy: phase diagram





#### The dynamics of the economy: phase diagram





### The dynamics of the economy: phase diagram



- E = intertemporal equilibrium ( $\dot{k} = \dot{c} = 0$ );
- given k(0), only c(0) = F is on the 'stable branch' that leads to E;
- c(0) < F leads to zero c and infinite k: not utility-maximizing!
- c(0) > F leads to negative k but positive c: not feasible!
- c(0) = F is the only c(0) that implies

 $\lim_{s\to\infty}e^{-R(s)}e^{(n+g)s}k(s)=0$ 

so it is the only feasible and utility-maximizing one.



## The saddle path

For any possible k(0), there is a unique c(0) that satisfies

$$\lim_{s\to\infty} e^{-R(s)} e^{(n+g)s} k(s) = 0$$

- this c(0) is the one on the 'saddle path'<sup>1</sup> towards steady state.
- all other c(0)'s are on unstable trajectories, but are ruled out by the no-Ponzi condition or by intertemporal optimization;
- saddle-path stable equilibrium.
- (quite obviously) it is Pareto-efficient.

[1] The reason for this name is the analogy with a marble left on top of a saddle. There is one point on the saddle where, if left there, the marble does not move. This point corresponds to the steady state. There is a trajectory on the saddle with the property that if the marble is left at any point on that trajectory, it rolls toward the steady state. But if the marble is left at any other point, the marble falls to the ground. (Barro & Sala i-Martin, *Economic growth*, 1990).



## The balanced growth path

- $\blacktriangleright \dot{k} = \dot{y} = \dot{c} = 0$
- $\blacktriangleright g_Y = g_K = g_C = n + g$
- $\blacktriangleright g_{Y/L} = g_{K/L} = g_{C/L} = g$
- exactly as in Solow model!
- ► here, however, k\* < k<sub>GR</sub>
  - o because  $\rho + \theta g > n + g$  (one of the assumptions of RCK model).
  - o households don't maximize c (as in the golden rule), but PV(c).
  - o  $\rho > 0$  creates a bias towards the present.



### A fall in the discount rate



- ►  $f'(k) = \rho + \theta g$
- ►  $c^* = f(k) (n+g)k$



## Diamond (1965): The Overlapping Generations (OLG) model





## OLG model: assumptions about households

- Time is discrete (t = 0, 1, 2, ...);
- each individual lives for two periods;
- $L_t = (1+n)L_{t-1}$  individuals born at time *t*;
- young (1st period):
  - no K
  - supplies 1 unit of L;
  - divides resulting wage between C and S;
- old (2nd period):
  - rents her K (=1st period savings)
  - then consumes (1+r)K



## OLG model: assumptions about production

At each t, old people's K and young people's L are combined to produce Y;

 $\blacktriangleright Y = F(K_t, A_t L_t)$ 

- CRS and Inada conditions (as in Solow & Ramsey);
- $\delta = 0$  for simplicity;
- ►  $A_t = (1+g)A_{t-1};$
- Competitive markets

$$r_t = f'(k_t)$$

$$\blacktriangleright w_t = f(k_t) - k_t f'(k_t)$$



# OLG model: The Plan

Focus on 
$$k = \frac{K}{AL}$$
.

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#### Our strategy:

- 1. *U* maximization  $\rightarrow C$  dynamics (Euler equation);
- 2. C dynamics  $\rightarrow$  dynamics of K & k  $\Rightarrow$   $k_{t+1}$  as a function of  $k_t$ ;
- 3. set  $k_{t+1} = k_t$  to study intertemporal equilibrium & stability.



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- 3. set  $k_{t+1} = k_t$  to study intertemporal equilibrium & stability.
- 1. using relatively general production and utility functions;
- stronger functional form assumptions needed to do 2. & 3.



## **Consumption dynamics**

Maximization of lifetime-utility...

$$U_t = \frac{C_{1t}^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta} + \frac{1}{1+\rho} \frac{C_{2t+1}^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta} \quad \text{with} \quad \theta > 0, \quad \rho > -1$$

...subject to the budget constraint

$$C_{1t} + \frac{1}{1 + r_{t+1}} C_{2t+1} = A_t w_t$$



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► f.o.c. imply the Euler Equation:

$$\frac{C_{2t+1}}{C_{1t}} = \left(\frac{1+r_{t+1}}{1+\rho}\right)^{1/\theta}$$



#### Discrete-time Euler equation: intuitive derivation

At the optimal point, a marginal reallocation of C from 1st to 2nd period does not affect utility:

$$C_{1t}^{-\theta} \Delta C = \frac{1}{1+\rho} C_{2t+1}^{-\theta} (1+r_{t+1}) \Delta C$$
 (2)

(marginal effect of change in  $C_1$  = marginal effect of change in  $C_2$ )

rearrange as

$$\frac{C_{2t+1}}{C_{1t}} = \left(\frac{1+r_{t+1}}{1+\rho}\right)^{1/\theta}$$



### Discrete-time Euler equation: 'systematic' derivation

Set the Lagrangian for the utility-maximization problem

$$\mathcal{L} = \frac{C_{1t}^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta} + \frac{1}{1+\rho} \frac{C_{2t+1}^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta} + \lambda [A_t w_t - (C_{1t} + \frac{1}{1+r_{t+1}}C_{2t+1})]$$

• f.o.c. for 
$$C_{1t}$$
 and  $C_{2t}$ :

$$C_{1t}^{- heta} = \lambda; \qquad rac{1}{1+
ho}C_{2t+1}^{- heta} = rac{1}{1+r_{t+1}}\lambda$$

Substitute for  $\lambda$  and rearrange:

$$\frac{C_{2t+1}}{C_{1t}} = \left(\frac{1+r_{t+1}}{1+\rho}\right)^{1/\theta}$$



## **Consumption dynamics**

Substitute Euler Equation into budget constraint to get

$$C_{1t} = \frac{(1+\rho)^{1/\theta}}{(1+\rho)^{1/\theta} + (1+r_{t+1})^{\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}}} A_t w_t$$

or more simply:

$$C_{1t} = [1 - s(r)]A_t w_t$$

with 
$$s(r) = 1 - \frac{C_{1t}}{A_t w_t} = \frac{(1+r)^{(1-\theta)/\theta}}{(1+\rho)^{1/\theta} + (1+r_{t+1})^{\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}}}$$

Implication: 1st period saving increasing in r if θ < 1; decreasing if θ > 1; s independent of r with logarithmic utility (θ = 1)



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- Implication: 1st period saving increasing in r if θ < 1; decreasing if θ > 1; s independent of r with logarithmic utility (θ = 1)
- r has both an income and a substitution effect.



Capital accumulation in a given period is:

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Focus on the intensive form (divided by  $A_{t+1}L_{t+1}$ ):

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$$k_{t+1} = \frac{1}{(1+n)(1+g)} s(r_{t+1}) w_t$$

Given one-good competitive economy, we can substitute for factors' prices:

$$k_{t+1} = \frac{1}{(1+n)(1+g)} s(f'(k_{t+1}))[f(k_t) - k_t f'(k_t)]$$



• We now have  $k_{t+1}$  as a (implicit) function of  $k_t$ :

$$k_{t+1} = \frac{1}{(1+n)(1+g)} s(f'(k_{t+1}))[f(k_t) - k_t f'(k_t)]$$
(3)

Assume 
$$f(k) = k^{\alpha} \& \theta = 1$$
:  
 $f(k) = k^{\alpha}; \quad f'(k) = \alpha k^{\alpha - 1}; \quad s = 1/(2 + \rho)$ 

So the equation of motion for k is:

$$k_{t+1} = \frac{1}{(1+n)(1+g)} \frac{1}{2+\rho} (1-\alpha) k_t^{\alpha} = \beta k_t^{\alpha} \quad \text{with } 0 < \alpha < 1$$





Econ 705, D.Girardi, AY 2023-24

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► In intertemporal equilibrium,  $k_t = k_{t+1} = k^*$ 

$$k^* = \frac{1}{(1+n)(1+g)(2+\rho)}(1-\alpha)k^{*\alpha}$$

$$k^* = \left[\frac{1-\alpha}{(1+n)(1+g)(2+\rho)}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$$



#### How fast is convergence in the OLG economy?

Linear approximation around steady state

$$k_{t+1} - k^* \approx \lambda(k_t - k^*)$$
 with  $\lambda = \frac{dk_{t+1}}{dk_t}\Big|_{k_t = k^*}$ 

Solving the (1st order linear) difference equation:

$$k_t - k^* \approx \lambda^t (k_0 - k^*)$$



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- w/ log *U* and Cobb-Douglas production:  $0 < \lambda = \alpha < 1$ ;
- With α = 1/3, two-thirds of the 'gap' removed in one period (=half a lifetime).



#### The general case

- With more general utility and production functions?
- Equation of motion for k:

$$k_{t+1} = \frac{1}{(1+n)(1+g)} s(r) \frac{f(k_t) - k_t f'(k_t)}{f(k_t)} f(k_t)$$

4 components: [AL<sub>t</sub>/AL<sub>t+1</sub>] [saving rate] [wage share] [Y/AL]

- $k_{t+1}$  depends on  $k_t$  through three channels;
- (almost) anything goes.

#### Diamond: Overlapping generations





- (a) and (c): multiple equilibria (s or W/Y increasing);
- (b): stable zero-output equilibrium (either s or W/Y approach 0 when k = 0);
- (d): indeterminacy (s 'very increasing' in k<sub>t</sub>).

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### Welfare & dynamic inefficiency

### • OLG equilibrium can be Pareto-inefficient ( $k^* > k^{GR}$ );



### Welfare & dynamic inefficiency

- OLG equilibrium can be Pareto-inefficient (k\* > k<sup>GR</sup>);
- Assume g = 0, Cobb-Douglass production and log utility:
  - ▶  $k^{GR}$  implies f'(k) = n.
  - $f'(k^*) = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}(1+n)(2+\rho)$
  - $\blacktriangleright \ \alpha \ {\rm small} \rightarrow f'(k^*) < n \rightarrow k^* > k^{GR}$
  - This possible dynamic inefficiency arises from relaxing the assumption of a finite number of agents.



### OLG model: Takeaways

- Same conclusions as Solow/Ramsey on sources of long-run growth;
- but possibility of multiple equilibria and dynamic inefficiency (overaccumulation)



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- Same conclusions as Solow/Ramsey on sources of long-run growth;
- but possibility of multiple equilibria and dynamic inefficiency (overaccumulation)
- Is neoclassical growth theory fragile even within its 'one-good economy with perfect markets' assumptions?
  - However, Barro (1974) shows that a bequest motive (intergenerational altruism) may make OLG practically equivalent to Ramsey (no inefficiencies).
  - Moreover, OLG dynamic inefficiency (over-accumulation) does not seem empirically relevant: too much accumulation??